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Cet article utilise une nouvelle approche institutionnaliste pour étudier certains 
conflits importants et certains changements de politiques relatifs à l’utilisation des 
terres qui ont eu un impact sur les relations de propriété des promoteurs immobiliers. 
Les approches institutionnalistes se concentrent sur le rôle d’acteurs, d’idées et de 
stratégies clés qui influencent les trajectoires des institutions politiques, et les 
manœuvres politiques et stratégiques face aux institutions et aux structures 
existantes. En comparant les processus qui ont mené à la promulgation de deux lois 
importantes sur l’utilisation des terres régionales – la Loi de 2001 sur la conservation 
de la moraine d’Oak Ridges et la Loi de 2005 sur la ceinture de verdure – le présent 
article examine le rôle des relations entre les acteurs politiques et les promoteurs 
immobiliers, et du climat politique sous-jacent, relativement au développement de 
ces lois et à leurs conséquences. L’article démontre que ces deux lois 
environnementales sur l’utilisation des terres, qui ont toutes deux des conséquences 
importantes sur les droits de propriété privée des propriétaires fonciers, comportent 
des différences significatives à la fois relativement à leur développement et à leur 
promulgation. L’article révèle aussi que la promulgation de lois provinciales sur 
l’utilisation des terres et leurs effets sur les droits de propriété privée font l’objet de 
plus importantes négociations et contestations politiques, et produisent des résultats 
moins prévisibles que ce qui était auparavant envisagé par le nouvel 
institutionnalisme. Cet article se fonde sur des études de cas pour illustrer les 
différentes façons dont les promoteurs immobiliers et les décideurs gouvernementaux 
clés exercent leur pouvoir, en travaillant à l’intérieur des structures juridiques 
existantes et contre celles-ci, pour faire avancer des agendas particuliers d’utilisation 
de l’espace urbain. 
This article uses a new institutionalist approach to investigate major land use conflicts 
and regional land use policy changes in the Toronto region that affected the property 
relations of land developers. Institutionalist approaches focus on the role of key actors, 
ideas, and strategies in influencing the trajectories of political institutions, and the 
confrontation of political and strategic maneuvering in the face of existing institutions 
and structures. Through comparison of the processes driving enactment of two major 
regional land use statutes—the Oak Ridge Moraine Conservation Act and the Greenbelt 
Act—this article pays close attention to the relationships between political actors and 
land developers, as well as the underlying political climate in shaping the development 
and outcomes of these statutes. This article shows that these two environmental land use 
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statutes, which both had significant implications for the private property rights of land 
owners, differed in important ways in both their development and enactment. This article 
also shows that the enactment of provincial land use laws and their effects on private 
property rights are subject to greater political negotiation and contestation, and more 
unpredictable outcomes, than previously considered within new institutionalism. This 
article draws on case study research to illuminate the varied ways that land developers 
and key governmental decision makers exercise power, working within and against 
existing legal structures to forward particular agendas vis-à-vis urban land use. 
 
THIS ARTICLE INVESTIGATES ENVIRONMENTALLY BASED LAND USE CONFLICTS and policy 
changes in the Toronto region to examine the relationships among the state, land developers, and 
private property rights.
1
 It compares two related Toronto region environmental conservation 
statutes, the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, 2001 
2
 and the Greenbelt Act, 2005
3
, paying 
particular attention to the role of government agendas and land developers’ property interest 
claims in shaping the parameters and functions of these statutes. Although differing in detail, 
both statutes represent attempts to reconcile tensions between land extensive urban development 
(i.e., sprawl) and preservation of the “countryside,” broadly defined. The Oak Ridges Moraine 
Conservation Act was passed 13 December 2001 under the provincial Ontario Progressive 
Conservative government led by then Premier Mike Harris.
4
 The Progressive Conservatives were 
defeated in 2003 by the Liberals led by Dalton McGuinty, who took office 23 October 2003. 
Under the McGuinty government, the Greenbelt Act was passed 28 February 2005.
5
 A central 
issue underpinning this investigation of the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act and the 
Greenbelt Act is the notion that although these environmental statutes have some similarities, 
they involved and affected land developers very differently. The purpose of this article is to 
critically examine the varied ways that land developers attempt to influence the formulation and 
                                                 
1
 By property law I am referring to property law in land (real property) or what is sometimes termed “land law;” 
e.g., Kevin Gray & Susan F Gray, Land Law, 7th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) [Gray & Gray, Land 
Law]. Denise Johnson suggests American property law comes from common law, statutes, and the Constitution. 
Denise Johnson, “Reflections on the Bundle of Rights” (2007) 32:2 Vt L Rev 247 at 248. While this might also 
broadly describe property law in Canadian common law jurisdictions, matters of organization, jurisdiction, and 
governance frameworks are also important. For example, in Canada, under the constitutional regime of federalism, 
the regulation of privately owned land is primarily a provincial responsibility, although the administration of land 
use is mainly municipal. David Pond, “Institutions, Political Economy and Land-use Policy: Greenbelt Politics in 
Ontario” (2009) 18:2 Environmental Politics 238 at 239 [Pond, “Greenbelt Politics”]. The provincially delegated 
authority of municipal councils to enact zoning and other by-laws is the primary tool through which private land use 
is regulated in Canadian cities, and the legal land use framework protects owners of private property insofar as it 
includes rules for fair, transparent, and predictable municipal planning procedures, such as zoning by-law changes 
and the processing of development applications. Ian Rogers & Alison Butler, Canadian Law of Planning and 
Zoning, 2nd ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005) [Rogers & Butler]. Provincial quasi-judicial tribunals also play 
a role in enacting property law in Canada. In Ontario, the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) adjudicates land use 
disputes. Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario, The Ontario Municipal Board (Toronto: ELTO, 2015), online: 
<elto.gov.on.ca> [perma.cc/WHK4-Y5HU]. 
2
 Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, 2001, SO 2001, c 31 [Conservation Act]. 
3
 Greenbelt Act, 2005, SO 2005, c 1 [Greenbelt Act]. 
4
 Conservation Act, supra note 2. 
5
 Greenbelt Act, supra note 3. 
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effects of land use legislation, and the political maneuvering developers and policy makers 
navigate as they attempt to exercise power to serve their own interests and agendas. 
 With a view to more explicitly foregrounding legal structures and practices and property 
rights claims within urban and planning scholarship, this article pays close attention to the ways 
that state actors and agencies confront and mobilize specific legal tools to navigate often 
competing agendas of environmental protection and economic growth. Broadly informed by new 
institutionalism,
6
 I illuminate different forms of state power to regulate land use, as well as the 
power of land developers to assert their claims to private property rights. I draw on this approach 
to highlight how political actors, working within institutional boundaries, can shape the legal 
geographies of land use and property rights for particular purposes. Certain strands of 
institutionalism, most notably “third-phase institutionalism,” place particular emphasis on how 
strategic political agencies and actors mobilize to navigate opportunities and constraints to 
institutional change.
7
 Historical institutionalism, on the other hand, attempts to account for and 
theorize institutional stability and change.
8
 Within the existing historical institutionalism 
literature, the rights of private property holders often appear to be stable, functioning to protect 
the expectations of owners.
9
 Yet in practice, the strategic regulation of land use, especially 
during periods of crisis, means that these rights are far from stable, and the changes both gradual 
and dramatic.
10
 Drawing on new institutionalism, notably third-phase and historical 
institutionalism, this article contributes to a growing literature in urban geography, planning, and 
socio-legal studies that critically examines the complex workings of property and property law.
11
 
This article advances scholarship on new institutionalism by extending its application to 
understanding the complexities of land use planning and disputes. By highlighting different 
outcomes from two land use disputes, this article also critiques overly structuralist tendencies 
within some historical institutionalist analyses, which have at times downplayed the role of 
power, politics, and conflict in triggering changes in the land use planning “system.” At the same 
time, this article, by employing an institutional approach, enhances understanding of urban 
planning, and socio-legal theory and conflict, especially by emphasizing the often unpredictable 
factors at play in the creation and resolution of land use conflict, and the often discounted role of 
key actors and ideas in shaping the outcomes of planning decisions. This article provides an 
example of what David Pond refers to as government “activism” regarding land use regulation,
12
 
                                                 
6
 Vivien Lowndes & Mark Roberts, Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) at 116, 117 [Lowndes & Roberts]; Jan Olsson, 
Subversion in Institutional Change and Stability: A Neglected Mechanism (London: Palgrave, 2015) at 23, 24 
[Olsson]. 
7
 Olsson, supra note 6 at 24. 
8
 E.g. see generally Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen & Frank Longstreth, Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
9
 John A Lovett, “Property and Radically Changed Circumstances” (2007) 74:4 Tenn L Rev 463 at 466. 
10
 André Sorensen, “Evolving Property Rights in Japan: Patterns and Logics of Change” (2011) 48:3 Urban Studies 
471 at 472 [Sorensen]; see, generally, José María Tubío-Sánchez, et al “Institutional Change in Land Planning: Two 
Cases from Galicia” (2013) 21:8 European Planning Studies 1276. 
11
 See, for example, Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property (New York: 
Routledge, 2004) [Blomley]; Eric Freyfogle, “Property and Liberty” (2010) 34:1 Harv Envtl Law Rev 75 
[Freyfogle]; Donald Krueckeberg, “The Difficult Character of Property: To Whom Do Things Belong?” (1995) 61:3 
Journal of the American Planning Association 301 [Krueckeberg]. 
12
 Pond, “Greenbelt Politics,” supra note 1 at 244. 
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and gives case study details to what Marcia Valiante and Anneke Smit describe as the “wide 




 This article proceeds as follows. Section I outlines connections in planning and legal 
scholarship to urban land use and regulation. This section also introduces theories of new 
institutionalism—the theoretical framework underpinning this article—suggesting ways that new 
institutionalism can contribute to addressing gaps in planning and socio-legal scholarship. I then 
proceed to explain the case study research, which is part of a broader research project conducted 
between 2011 and 2013. Over this two-year period I conducted thirty interviews with suburban 
developers, planners, environmental activists, and politicians in order to explore the relationship 
between land developers and the land use planning and regulatory system in the Toronto region. 
I also conducted extensive document analysis, including that of provincial government debates 
and legislation, and coverage of these debates in local newspapers, especially the Toronto Star 
and Globe and Mail. In the final section, I compare the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, 
2001 and the Greenbelt Act, 2005, showing that these two pieces of environmental land use 
legislation differed in important ways in both their development and enactment.
14
 By way of 
conclusion I offer a number of ways that an institutional approach contributes to an 
understanding of legal processes governing land use. Institutionalist approaches focus on the role 
of key actors, ideas, and strategies in influencing the trajectories of land based property disputes, 
and the confrontation of political and strategic maneuvering in the face of existing institutions 
and structures.  
 
I. PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN URBAN AND PLANNING 
SCHOLARSHIP 
 
Scholarship on the role of property and the law in land use planning and regulation is growing, 
albeit slowly. Writing in the early 1990s, Donald Krueckeberg suggested that planning is not 
simply about “land use,” a seemingly objective process of categorizing and sorting activities 
according to their “proper” spatial location.
15
 Rather, Krueckeberg argued, planning is more 
accurately about property: a much richer concept that involves competing values of land and land 
use activities, competing views of the role of the state in the “intervention” in private property, 
and an explicit recognition that land use decisions are moral and contested, rather than rational 
and objective. Despite this statement of the central importance of property in planning, Amanda 
Davies and Mark Atkinson lament that planning theory has given property no more than cursory 
attention, Harvey Jacobs and Kurt Paulsen refer to property rights as a “neglected theme” in 
American planning scholarship, and Marcia Valiante and Anneke Smit suggest the Canadian 
planning literature has given little attention to the role of private property rights in the regulation 
                                                 
13
 Marcia Valiante & Anneke Smit, “Introduction” in Anneke Smit & Marcia Valiante, eds, Public Interest, Private 
Property: Law and Planning Policy in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015) at 13 [Valiante & Smit]. They argue 
that this is the result of the general refusal of Canadian courts to include protection of private property rights as a 
Charter right. See also Ronit Levine-Schnur, “Revitalizing Land Use Law: Introductory Notes” (2017) this issue, for 
a discussion of a virtual absence of substantial judicial review of municipal land use law in Canada.  
14
 Conservation Act, supra note 2; Greenbelt Act, supra note 3. 
15
 Krueckeberg, supra note 11 at 301. 
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of urban space.
16
 There are many notable exceptions to this neglect of property in planning 
scholarship, especially outside of the North American context. For example, work on planning 
and property in the Netherlands has investigated the role of state ownership of land in controlling 
private speculation.
17
 Carrying out research on gated communities in China and England, Sarah 
Blandy and Feng Wang illustrate the intersections of law and power, showing that neoliberal 
schemes of partnership between developers and local political actors can serve to bypass existing 
land use policies, although the exact mechanisms of how these policies are bypassed are not 
discussed.
18
 Bhuvaneswari Raman investigates the use of planning tools in the granting of 
property rights to squatters in Delhi, India, as a neoliberal state project of poverty reduction.
19
 
These studies show that rules around private property, land use regulation, and land use planning 
intersect in complex ways, are often politicized and influenced by exercises of power, and have 
immediate implications for urban development. 
 Although rarely writing explicitly about land use regulation and planning,
20
 socio-legal 
scholars and legal geographers have had much to say about property, property rights, and land.
21
 
Common planning issues, such as urban sprawl, intensification, and redevelopment confront 
normative and moral evaluations of how land should be used and what responsibilities owners 
should assume.
22
 The moral dimensions of property have been shown to pervade ideas of 
property rights, especially during conflicts over proposals for land use change.
23
 As Damien 
Collins states, while property rights “can be articulated in absolutist terms, their enactment has 
always depended upon broad social and legal acceptance.”
24
 Property rights have social and 
legal dimensions, the former of which are often articulated forcefully during land use disputes. 
                                                 
16
 Amanda Davies & Mark Atkinson, “The Moderating Influence of Property Legislation on Planning Policy and 
Urban Form” (2012) 49:16 Urban Studies 3479 at 3480; Harvey Jacobs & Kurt Paulsen, “Property Rights: The 
Neglected Theme of 20th-Century American Planning” (2009) 75:2 Journal of the American Planning Association 
134; Valiante & Smit, supra note 13 at 2. 
17
 Edwin Buitelaar & Arno Segeren, “Urban Structures and Land. The Morphological Effects of Dealing With 
Property Rights” (2011) 26:5 Housing Studies 661; Ary Samsura, Erwin van der Krabben & AMA van Deemen, “A 
Game Theory Approach to the Analysis of Land and Property Development Processes” (2010) 27:2 Land Use 
Policy 564; Terry Van Dijk & Arno van der Vlist, “On the Interaction Between Landownership and Regional 
Designs for Land Development” (2015) 52:10 Urban Studies 1899.  
18
 Sarah Blandy & Feng Wang, “Curbing the Power of Developers? Law and Power in Chinese and English Gated 
Urban Enclaves” (2013) 47 Geoforum 199. 
19
 Bhuvaneswari Raman, “The Politics of Property in Land: New Planning Instruments, Law and Popular Groups in 
Delhi” (2015) 10:3 Journal of South Asian Development 369 [Raman]. 
20
 For example, reviews of the socio-legal scholarship in legal geography and critical legal studies, although 
ostensibly focused on space, place, and landscape, mention little about the role of the law in urban planning, 
although there is some attention given to ‘municipal law;’ e.g., Luke Bennett & Antonia Layard, “Legal Geography: 
Becoming Spatial Detectives” (2015) 9:7 Geography Compass 406; Chris Butler, “Critical Legal Studies and the 
Politics of Space” (2009) 18:3 Soc & Leg Stud 313; David Delaney, “Legal Geography I: Constitutivities, 
Complexities, and Contingencies” (2015) 39: 1 Progress in Human Geography 96; David Delaney, “Legal 
Geography II: Discerning Injustice” (2016) 40:2 Progress in Human Geography 267. 
21
 Katrina Myrvang Brown, “Understanding the Materialities and Moralities of Property: Reworking Collective 
Claims to Land” (2009) 32:4 Trans Inst Br Geogr 507; Blomley, supra note 11, Freyfogle, supra note 11. 
22
 Damian Collins, “Contesting Property Development in Coastal New Zealand: A Case Study of Ocean Beach, 
Hawke’s Bay” (2009) 33:1 International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 147 at 149 [Collins]. 
23
 Blomley, supra note 11, especially chapter 3. 
24
 Collins, supra note 22 at 149. 
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Even though private property regimes require governmental regulation to function,
25
 owners of 
real property often deploy morally based assertions of private property rights to argue against 
environmental policies that restrict their own land use.
26
 Moral assertions of this variety 
prioritize individual economic growth opportunities, and unless environmental protection can be 
framed in terms of resource protection, broad political support by landowners is unlikely.
27
 
Moral assertions are far from benign, as majority support for particular claims can lead to 
legislatures enacting new laws.
28
 A moral dilemma facing land use regulators’ statutory power to 
enact regulatory measures stems from the questions of who pays for (broadly understood), and 
who benefits from, regulations.
29
 Greenbelts or other urban boundary constraints, for example, 
might serve to increase the value and potential profits from land in the aggregate by removing 
supply,
30
 but for owners whose land has been removed from the market, the costs of greenbelt 
legislation are very high. 
 Recent urban scholarship has drawn on different strands of “new institutionalism” to 
investigate with more nuance the governance of urban development and land use. New 
institutionalists generally argue that history and formal rules matter in government and 
governance, but local cultures, informal practices, and ideas can also shape, in important ways, 
how policies are developed and practiced.
31
 Drawing on the “interpretive institutionalism” of 
Marc Bevir and Rod Rhodes, geographers David Gibbs and Rob Krueger analyze smart growth 
in the Boston city-region, arguing that the governance of city-regional land use is shaped by a 
combination of historically inherited rules, as well as ever-evolving “traditions” and “beliefs” of 
political actors in land use planning and governance institutions.
32
 Drawing more on a 
structuralist form of historical institutionalism, Andre Sorensen and Paul Hess explain the 
Toronto region suburban development pattern as the effect of rules and systems (especially 
around infrastructure provision) put in place in the post-World War II period.
33
 Implicit in this 
framing is the power of initial decisions, the path dependency of decisions that follow, and the 
stability of resulting systems. Absent in this framework are actors, politics, or specific 
mechanisms through which land use planning and governance are carried out. While Sorensen 
                                                 
25
 Carol Rose, “Liberty, Property, Environmentalism” (2009) 26:2 Social Philosophy & Policy 1 at 11 [Rose, 
“Liberty”]. In terms of land use, at the most basic level limitations on one individual landowner's property rights are 
necessary insofar as they protect the rights of others, including other landowners and the broader ‘public interest’ 
now and in the future. Laura Underkuffler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) at 96 [Underkuffler]; Freyfogle, supra note 11 at 83. 
26
 Collins, supra note 22 at 149. 
27
 See generally, Rose, “Liberty,” supra note 25. 
28
 Freyfogle, supra note 11 at 83. 
29
 Kevin Gray & Susan Gray, “The Idea of Property in Land” in Susan Bright & John Dewar, eds, Land Law: 
Themes and Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 24 [Gray & Gray, “Idea of Property”] 
30
 Amal K Ali “Greenbelts to Contain Urban Growth in Ontario, Canada: Promises and Prospects” (2008) 23:4 
Planning, Practice & Research 533 at 536; Yvonne Rydin, Housing Land Policy (London: Ashgate, 1986) at 31. 
31
 See generally, Vivien Lowndes, “Rescuing Aunt Sally: Taking Institutional Theory Seriously in Urban Politics” 
(2001) 38:11 Urban Studies 1953. 
32
 David Gibbs & Rob Krueger, “Fractures in Meta-Narratives of Development: An Interpretive Institutionalist 
Account of Land Use Development in the Boston City-Region” (2012) 36:2 Int J Urban and Reg 363 at 376; Mark 
Bevir & Rod Rhodes, The State as Cultural Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
33
 André Sorensen & Paul Hess, “Building Suburbs, Toronto-Style: Land Development Regimes, Institutions, 
Critical Junctures and Path Dependence” (2015) 86:4 Town Planning Review 411 at 412 [Sorensen & Hess]. 
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and Hess describe in detail the “architecture” of the rules and institutions controlling land 
development in the Toronto region, they emphasize the power of planners and the planning 
system. There is no attention paid to the politics that fuel institutional development and change, 
and little regard for the role of elite actors, such as land developers, in influencing the negotiation 
and application of planning and legal institutions. Both historical and interpretive institutionalism 
are much better at explaining institutional stability than change,
34
 and the emphasis on the effects 
of “stable” planning and governance institutions in planning scholarship reflects this theoretical 
tendency. Perhaps that is why land use and property law are not much considered in these 
literatures—they are assumed to be objective, stable, and apolitical. On the other hand, 
economists and legal scholars have long surmised that property rights and the law are politically 
negotiated and constructed, and “evolve” over time.
35
 But it is not simply the evolution of 
property rights and property law that is of interest here; rather, I am interested in the underlying 
characteristics and conditions at play that allow for this evolution. 
 Theoretically, I draw on new institutionalism, specifically third-phase institutionalism, 
which itself owes much to historical institutionalism, in order to more fully explain the politics of 
private property rights in shaping the outcomes of land use planning, development, and 
conflict.
36
 Lowndes and Roberts conceptualize third-phase institutionalism as a consolidation of 
several strands of new institutionalism, including historical, rational choice, sociological, and 
discursive institutionalism. Although differing in emphasis in the importance of structural forces 
versus individual agency, these forms of new institutionalism seek to explain the workings of 
political life, and historical institutionalism privileges processes of institutional stability and 
change.
37
 Third-phase institutionalism places particular emphasis on strategic political agency, 
especially as a key factor in institutional change.
38
 Political agency can be described in this 
context as “combative acts,” where political actors consider their actions within the constraints of 
acceptable rules and norms, strategically evaluating which rules can be subverted and how power 
can be mobilized to achieve particular ends.
39
 Constraints and prevailing rules can be actively, 
albeit often covertly, resisted. In this context, land use and private property rights, as well as the 
“planning system” with its well-defined procedures, can be considered institutions
40
–sets of 
formal and informal rules that enable, constrain, or shape in some way social interactions and 
outcomes.
41
 In this sense, private property rights, as Demetrio Muñoz-Gielen states, are a type of 
                                                 
34
 See, generally Guy B Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism, 3rd ed (New 
York: Continuum, 2012); Vivien Schmidt, “Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change Through 
Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth ‘New Institutionalism’” (2010) 2 European Political Science Review 1. 
35
 E.g., Terry P Anderson & PJ Hill, “The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West” (1975) 
18:1 JL & Econ 163; Oona A Hathaway, “Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in 
a Common Law System” (2001) 86 Iowa L Rev 601. 
36
 Lowndes & Roberts, supra note 6; Olsson, supra note 6. 
37
 Olsson, supra note 6. 
38




 John Brigham, Property and the Politics of Entitlement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990) [Brigham]. 
41
 Timothy C Lim, Doing Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Approaches and Issues, 2nd ed (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2010) [Lim]. 
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formal rule that can “decisively influence power relations between public and private actors.”
42
 
The institution of private property, in a new institutionalist framework, is not simply a rational 
system for maximizing individual preferences, nor is it simply the product of larger political, 
social, or economic systems. Private property rights are continuously claimed and contested in a 
complex institutional setting that has the potential to change in various ways for different 
reasons.
43
 Analyzing the outcomes of property disputes, then, becomes a matter of investigating 
the particular events, actors, and ideas that shaped the disputes. In my case study, for example, I 
show that electoral politics and pre-existing state-corporate relationships were important factors 
shaping land use legislation that affected existing private property rights. Examining how 
political elements shape private property interests requires close attention to governance cultures 
and context-specific strategies to understand how land use policies are developed and enacted in 
practice. Furthermore, I show how specific decisions about property not only have material and 
geographical consequences, but also how specific places and actors influence property decisions 
in particular ways. These decisions are shaped in tangible ways by local politics and actors, 
leading to highly place-based material consequences. 
 Changes in land use legislation are often politically charged, as they can directly impact 
owners of private property. Christopher Rodgers notes that private property rights can shift in 
practice when, for example, authorities enact new laws that change the property rights of 
owners.
44
 Land use legislation, as Carol Rose notes, is often rationalized based on the “public 
interest,” which can have multiple meanings based on particular spatial and temporal contexts.
45
 
What constitutes the public interest, and therefore the parameters of state regulation of land use, 
is a matter of history, framing, contestation, ideology, strategy, and so on. Laura Underkuffler 
notes that the values underlying property claims can be spatially and temporally fluid.
46
 As 
Raman notes, “property rights and relations are continuously being reconfigured out of contests 
over meaning, boundaries and the mutual constitution of property and social relations, including 
state-citizen relationships. The state, by virtue of its role as a guarantor of property, plays a key 
role in defining, establishing and enforcing property boundaries.”
47
 But state actors and agencies 
act strategically to navigate the rules and external pressures to manage conflict and achieve 
political goals, such as economic development or environmental protection. In other words, how 
and under what conditions political actors influence “property rights and relations,” to use 
Raman’s phrasing, is an important question for empirical investigation. The next section turns to 
a case study in the Toronto region, highlighting the complexity of planning, property rights, and 
land use law as tools ostensibly mobilized to protect the environment, and the power of 
developers to shape the content and use of these tools. 
                                                 
42
 Demetrio Muñoz-Gielen, “Urban Governance, Property Rights, Land Readjustment and Public Value Capturing” 
(2012) 21:1 European Urban and Regional Studies 60 at 61. 
43
Sorensen, supra note 10 at 480. Sorensen lists court decisions, citizen activism, and elections as some of the forces 
triggering institutional change, although he notes change is often slow, taking the form of two steps forward and one 
step back. 
44
 Christopher Rodgers, “Nature’s Place? Property Rights, Property Rules and Environmental Stewardship” (2009) 
68:3 Cambridge LJ 550 at 564 [Rodgers]. 
45
 Carol Rose, “Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law” (2000) 1 Utah L Rev 1 at 1 
[Rose, “Property and Expropriation”] 
46
 Underkuffler, supra note 25 at 93. 
47
 Raman, supra note 19 at 389. 
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II. REGULATING PROPERTY IN THE TORONTO REGION 
 
The Oak Ridges Moraine (ORM), located north of Toronto, Canada's largest city, is an 
approximately 160 km long east-west trending geological landscape formed through glacial till 
deposition (Figure 1).
48
 The ORM consists of complex layers of bedrock, sand, gravel, and other 
glacial deposits; lakes and marshes drain into these layers, and several aquifers of varying depths 
feed a network of rivers and streams with a continuous flow of groundwater.
49
 The ORM, 
especially since the mid-1990s, has become framed as a sensitive landscape based on its ability 
to store and filter groundwater.
50
 But as part of it is within Canada's largest urban region, the 
ORM has also been the site of intense development pressure, and suburban developers have 
come to see it as an ideal location to house an ever-expanding population. This section outlines 
the history of this development pressure and the land conflict it triggered when development was 
resisted by environmental and homeowner groups, as well as by some municipal councils and 
planning authorities. It then documents the provincial government’s response to the conflict. In 
doing so, this section delves into specific negotiations the provincial government undertook with 
key developers on the Oak Ridges Moraine and suggests the rationale for and implications of 
these special negotiations. 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s developers had been putting pressure on municipal 
planning departments on the ORM to approve their plans to build thousands of houses on the 
moraine; environmentalists, anti-sprawl activists, and homeowner groups opposed these 
development plans by challenging sprawl and by proposing stringent limits on development to 
preserve natural areas.
51
 While some local municipalities on the ORM, as well as the provincial 
Government, undertook efforts in the 1990s to protect the ORM,
52
 these efforts were resisted by 
developers, who claimed that the protection of environmental features on private lands amounted 
to “expropriation without compensation.”
53
 
                                                 
48
 PJ Barnett et al, “On the Origin of the Oak Ridges Moraine” (1998) 35:10 Canadian Journal of Earth Sciences 




 Stephen Bocking, “Protecting the Rain Barrel: Discourses and the Roles of Science in a Suburban Environmental 
Controversy” (2005) 14:5 Environmental Politics 611 at 612. 
51
 Anders Sandberg, Gerda Wekerle & Liette Gilbert, The Oak Ridges Moraine Battles: Development, Sprawl, and 
Nature Conservation in the Toronto Region (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013) [Sandberg, Wekerle, & 
Gilbert]. 
52
 The strongest provincial effort to protect the ORM prior to conservation legislation was undertaken by the Liberal 
and NDP governments. The Liberals declared a “provincial interest” in the ORM in July 1990, and appointed the 
Oak Ridges Moraine Technical Working Committee to develop interim land use guidelines for development on the 
moraine, which were never formalized but were nevertheless used by many municipalities. The work was continued 
by the NDP government (who defeated the Liberals in October 1990) resulting in publication of fifteen reports. The 
Technical Working Committee was disbanded when the Conservatives came to power in 1995. York Region, 
Durham Region & Peel Region, The Oak Ridges Moraine: Towards a Long Term Strategy, (1999) online: 
<durham.ca/departments/planed/planning/provincial_links/oakridges/bgpaper091799.pdf> [perma.cc/7TKV-9S4Q]. 
53
 Brian Dexter, “‘A better way of living’: Rural Uxbridge retains its small-town atmosphere,” Toronto Star (16 
June 2001) N1; Richard Lindgren & Karen Clark, Property Rights Versus Land Use Regulation: Debunking the 
Myth of ‘Expropriation without Compensation’ (Toronto: Canadian Environmental Law Association, 1994) at 2 
[Lindgren & Clark]; Gail Swainson, “Battle lines drawn over Oak Ridges Moraine. Richmond Hill under fire: 
Developers slam council for changing its position on land,” Toronto Star (12 January 2000) B1. 
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Figure 1. The Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan Area in southern Ontario.
54
 
                                                 
54
 Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, The Oak Ridges Moraine (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 
2002), online: <mah.gov.on.ca/Page1738.aspx> [perma.cc/RDZ7-DHTEN]. 
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 While claims of expropriation without compensation are perhaps to be expected when 
landowners are faced with government regulations affecting what owners plan to do with their 
land, these claims often have little legal basis. Private property rights are not protected under the 
Canadian constitution. Section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 grants provincial legislatures the 
authority to make laws in relation to property.
55
 The Canadian Bill of Rights does indeed protect 
“enjoyment of property,” but only to the extent that one cannot be deprived of this right except in 
accordance with “due process of law;” it does not protect abstract property rights in land.
56
 With 
the legal absence of protection of property rights at the federal level, coupled with numerous 
statutory and common law limitations on property rights (e.g., environmental and nuisance laws), 
provincial and federal governments have considerable ability to appropriate so-called 
“development rights” without having to compensate landowners, as long as legislation serves a 
justifiable public purpose.
57
 According to Justice Cromwell in Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v Nova 
Scotia, “de facto expropriations are very rare in Canada and they require proof of virtual 
extinction of an identifiable interest in land.”
58
 Cases that have resulted in compensation from 
statutes affecting zoning are rare in Canada; a key criterion is that the value of land has been 
nearly diminished entirely.
59
 At no time was this degree of devaluation applicable to proposed 
regulation of development on the ORM. Yet, as discussed below, developers claims of private 
property rights often ‘haunted’ the process of imagining and devising conservation legislation on 
the ORM,
60
 often through threats of lawsuits and claims of unfairness.
61
  
 The contest between developers advocating for their property right and their opponents 
arguing for environmental protection
62
 reached new heights in the early 2000s, such that the 
Conservative provincial government, led by Premier Mike Harris, began to develop legislation to 
limit urban development in parts of the ORM.
63
 Even though the Harris government was, as 
Roger Keil describes, “uncompromisingly neoliberal” and ideologically opposed to government 
                                                 
55
 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5, S 92. 
56
 Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44, Ss1(a). 
57
 See generally Rogers & Butler, supra note 1. 
58
 Mariner Real Estate Ltd v Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1999] 177 DLR (4th) 696 (NS CA) at para 83. 
59
 The few oft-cited successful cases of de facto expropriation (i.e., where regulators must compensate owners for 
regulatory takings) include: Manitoba Fisheries Ltd v The Queen, [1979] 1 SCR 101 (SCC); The Queen in right of 
British Columbia v Tener et al (1985), 17 DLR. (4th) 1 (SCC); Casamiro Resource Corp v British Columbia (1991), 
55 BCLR (2d) 346. 
60
 David Donnelly & Jonathan Tryanski, “Property Rights in Canada: Ontario’s Greenbelt Act” in Allan 
Greenbaum, Ronald Pushchak & Alex Wellington, eds, Canadian Issues in Environmental Law and Policy 
(Concord, On: Captus Press, 2009) at 341. While Donnelly and Tryanki are mainly referring to the Ontario 
Greenbelt, they include in their analysis ORM conservation legislation and the claims by developers of lost property 
rights. 
61
 For example, the president of the Greater Toronto Home Builders Association suggested developers were 
considering legal action in response to a provincial moratorium on development applies to the ORM in May 2001. 
Gail Swainson & Richard Brennan, “Moraine Moratorium Law Passes: Environmentalists Hail, Developers Hate 
Six-Month Ban,” Toronto Star (18 May 2001) B1. 
62
 The actual “battle lines” around the conflict were much more complex, and also involved planners and politicians 
of municipalities located on the ORM as well as key decision makers at the Ontario Municipal Board. See, generally 
Sandberg, Wekerle, & Gilbert, supra note 52. 
63
 Oak Ridges Moraine Protection Act, SO 2001, c 3 [Protection Act]. 
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 in order to maintain public support, the Harris government 
responded to development opposition and passed conservation legislation, the Oak Ridges 
Moraine Protection Act,
65
 on 17 May 2001. This interim legislation prevented developers from 
submitting new development applications to municipal planning departments on the ORM for a 
period of six months, after which new legislation and a conservation plan would be put in place. 
Specifically, the Oak Ridges Moraine Protection Act prevented municipalities from enacting new 
by-laws, approving official plans or official plan amendments, and approving draft or final plans 
of subdivisions within the Oak Ridges Moraine Plan Area (Figure 1),
66
 and precluded individual 
applicants from applying for those same things.
67
 The legislation was in effect a significant 
limitation on private property rights, as existing procedural law outlined in the Planning Act
68
 
and that dictated the municipal processing of development applications was essentially put on 
hold. The Planning Act specifies procedures and timeframes for proposed zoning changes, plans 
of subdivision, land severances, and amendments to official plans, and also the procedures and 
timeframes for appealing municipal decisions to the Ontario Municipal Board. All of these 
procedures were put on hold through the Oak Ridges Moraine Protection Act. 
 During the six-month period established by the Oak Ridges Moraine Protection Act, the 
Conservative government led public and stakeholder consultations to devise guidelines for the 
permanent protection of the ORM. It also struck the thirteen member Oak Ridges Moraine 
Advisory Panel (ORMAP) that included three ORM land developers, as well as representatives 
from environmental organizations, different levels of government, agriculture and aggregate 
industries, and academia; the role of the ORMAP was to develop and formulate 
recommendations for ORM protection that the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Chris 
Hodgson, could then use to develop legislation and a Plan for the ORM.
69
 The main 
recommendation of the ORMAP was to create four land use designations on the ORM that 
specified permitted land uses, the intent being to protect the most environmentally sensitive areas 
while still permitting development in existing urbanized areas.
70
 
 Hodgson attempted to address the interests of developers during the formulation of ORM 
legislation and Plan. As such, Hodgson made deals with four ORM developers (including the 
three on the ORMAP) to exchange certain developer-owned land on the ORM with provincially-
owned lands in an adjacent municipality, Pickering, Ontario (Figure 2).
71
 This land exchange 
became known as the “Seaton Land Exchange” because the land the developers received in 
                                                 
64
 Roger Keil, “‘Common-sense’ Neoliberalism: Progressive Conservative Urbanism in Toronto, Canada” (2002) 
34:3 Antipode 578 at 588 [Keil]. 
65
 Protection Act, supra note 63. 
66
 Protection Act, supra note 63 at s 2(1).  
67
 Protection Act, supra note 63 at s 3(1).  
68
 Planning Act, RSO 1990, c P13 [Planning Act]. 
69
 Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Share Your Vision for the Oak Ridges Moraine (Toronto: Queen’s 
Printer for Ontario, 2002) [MMAH, Share Your Vision]. 
70
 The four categories include: “natural core areas,” which contain the most environmentally sensitive areas; 
“natural linkage areas,” which link natural core areas; “countryside areas,” which include agricultural land; and 
“settlement areas”, which include lands already approved for urban land use; ibid. 
71
 Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Principles: North Pickering Land Exchange and Development 
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2002) [MMAH, Land Exchange]. 
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Pickering had long been planned for development of a city called Seaton.
72
 As is further 
elaborated below, as part of the deal, Hodgson also used a minister's zoning order
73
 to permit the 
developers to build 6,600 housing units on approximately 375 hectares of land within the ORM, 
which would become the subdivisions “Macleod’s Landing” and “Bond Lake Village” in 
Richmond Hill, a town on the ORM north of Toronto.
74
 This, as well as the land exchange, 
allowed Hodgson to garner developer support for protection of the rest of the ORM. 
 A land exchange had long been suggested by the environmental group, Save the Oak 
Ridges Moraine (STORM), as one way to remove development interests from the moraine.
75
 Of 
the four developers involved in the Seaton land exchange, three owned land in Richmond Hill 
and one owned land in Uxbridge, a township north of Pickering, and all had active development 
applications that were put on hold by the Oak Ridges Moraine Protection Act. The Richmond 
Hill development applications were very contentious, triggered massive citizen mobilization 
contesting the proposals, and resulted in failure on the part of Richmond Hill city council to   
                                                 
72
 Plans for Seaton began in 1972 in conjunction with plans for an international airport in North Pickering and 
surrounding areas; John Van Nostrand, Seaton: The form of its history. A socio-economic history of the Seaton lands 
within the North Pickering Planning Area (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Housing, 1990). 
73
 A zoning order gives the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, authorized through the Planning Act, the 
ability to rezone any land in Ontario for various reasons, including to protect a “provincial interest”. Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing, Citizen’s Guide: Zoning By-Laws (Toronto: Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing, Provincial Planning Policy Branch, 2010) at 7 [MMAH, Citizen’s Guide]. 
74
 Carolyn Mallan, “Moraine land deal a boost for green space: Province agrees to swap plan ends years of heated 
debate,” Toronto Star (24 September 2004); Ian Urquhart, Richard Brennan & Gail Swainson, “Land swap saves 
moraine: Development frozen as Tories offer Seaton property to builders,” Toronto Star (1 November 2001) A1. 
75
 Brian McAndrew, “Showdown at the Oak Ridges Moraine: Scenic green space or urban sprawl? The battle lines 
have been drawn,” Toronto Star (12 February 2000) H1, H8. 
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Figure 2. Seaton land exchange. Land developers exchanged Richmond Hill and Uxbridge lands 
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make a decision on the applications.
77
 As a result, these developers were part of group of 
Richmond Hill landowners that had appealed their development applications to the Ontario 
Municipal Board (OMB), the quasi-judicial appeals tribunal charged with resolving land use 
planning disputes in Ontario.
78
 The OMB had not yet made a decision when the Oak Ridges 
Moraine Protection Act was passed in May 2001. 
 After the six-month period following passage of the Oak Ridges Moraine Protection Act, 
the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, 2001,
79
 was passed in the provincial legislature, 
which put significant limits on land development on the ORM and which gave the Minister of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing the authority to establish the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation 
Plan.
80
 The Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act included “transitional provisions” that were 
applicable to “all applications, matters or proceedings commenced on or after November 17, 
2001”
81
 (given the six-month moratorium on development authorized by Oak Ridges Moraine 
Protection Act, the applicable date was actually 17 May 2001). The transitional clause stated that 
any planning decisions made by planning authorities prior to 17 November 2001 (actually 17 
May 2001) were permitted to proceed; applications where decisions had not been rendered, 
including by the OMB, were required to “conform to the prescribed provisions of the Oak Ridges 
Moraine Conservation Plan as if the Plan were in force on or before the date the application, 
matter or proceeding was commenced.”
82
 The applications made by the developers involved in 
the Seaton land exchange had yet to be approved, and without a special deal would have been 
subject to the new provisions. As Rodgers notes, new legislation has the potential to shift the 
prevailing property rights of owners,
83
 in this case by eliminating the right of landowners to 
apply to have the zoning of their land changed from rural to urban. This is one way that private 
property rights can be construed as political—subject to land use conflict and a state legislative 
response, such as new environmental regulations.
84
 While conservation legislation did not alter 
the ownership of land for ORM landowners in terms of title, it shifted the suite of property rights 
that they previously enjoyed, including the right to develop their land if granted permission to do 
so by local municipal planning authorities. For the land exchange developers, however, property 
rights took on a very different form, as is explained below. 
 In contrast to limiting the use of private property through new provincial legislation that 
defined how land would be zoned, the Seaton land exchange was in effect an expropriation with 
compensation, where developers were compensated for loss of their so-called “development 
                                                 
77
 Planning Act, supra note 68. 
78
 Ontario Municipal Board, Decision /Order No. 0809, 25 May 2001. 
79
 Conservation Act, supra note 2. 
80
 The Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, 2001, which was passed in the Ontario Legislature on 13 December 
2001, was part of a comprehensive provincial strategy for the ORM that also included a draft Oak Ridges Moraine 
Conservation Plan, the objectives of which were established by the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, 2001. 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan (Toronto: Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2002) [MMAH, Conservation Plan]. The Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan 
was established by Ontario Regulation 140/02, which came into effect 22 April 2002. 
81




 Rodgers, supra note 44 at 557. 
84
 Rodgers, supra note 44 at 553. 
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rights” on ORM lands by the granting of lands of similar value off the ORM.
85
 While a clear 
rationale for the land exchange has never been offered by the province, it likely has to do with 
the exceptional nature of both the land itself and of the political context. The Richmond Hill 
lands in particular were deemed by environmental activists and provincial government agencies, 
drawing on conservation biology principles, to be of ecological significant and in need of 
protection.
86
 Furthermore, as an example of what Sandberg and Wekerle refer to as “rural 
gentrification,” wealthy exurban homeowners’ groups opposed development in Richmond Hill, 
as they feared development would jeopardize the amenity value of an exclusive and scenic 
landscape.
87
 The ORM land use conflicts seemed to take on what Frederic Deng describes as a 
prototypical controversy in land use change that creates a dilemma for land use regulators: “the 
problems of NIMBY (not in my back yard) and ‘regulatory takings’.”
88
 In other words, 
opponents to development demand increased land use regulation to protect a valuable resource, 
while proponents argue that increased land use regulation is an affront to private property rights. 
These development proposals became very politicized, and were likely the catalyst for provincial 
government action to protect the ORM. The result is that four developers were able to escape the 
full impact of the legislation that changed the private property rights of all other ORM 
landowners. Through the land exchange, these developers were also able to have their property 
rights shifted from one site, the ORM in Richmond Hill, to another, Seaton in Pickering. While a 
contested idea (e.g., see Sarah Hamill, this volume
89
), to some property and socio-legal theorists, 
property is not a thing, but a social relationship with respect to things.
90
 In this case, the 
relationship between developers and the state proved to be crucial. The “thing” was not really 
even land, at least particular parcels of land. It was the right, given by a planning authority, to 
profit from the transformation of a land from one land use category (rural) to another (urban).
91
 It 
was the ability to escape a provincial level policy limiting the use of land. No other ORM 
landowners were provided a way to escape this legislation that significantly impacted the use of 
private property. 
 As mentioned above, some of the Seaton land exchange developers profited from 
exceptions to the ORM legislation in another way: through a zoning order Minister Hodgson 
used in 2001 granting developers permission to build 6,600 housing units on the ORM in 
                                                 
85
 The land exchange was an expropriation in that the provincial government took ownership of land rather than 
simply regulate its use. 
86
 Graham Whitelaw & Paul Eagles, “Planning for Long, Wide Conservation Corridors on Private Lands in the Oak 
Ridges Moraine, Ontario, Canada” (2007) 21:3 Conserv Biol 675 at 680. 
87
 Anders Sandberg & Gerda Wekerle, “Reaping Nature’s Dividends: The Neoliberalization and Gentrification of 
Nature on the Oak Ridges Moraine” (2010) 12:1 J Environ Policy Plann 41 at 46. 
88
 Frederic F Deng, “The Rebound of Private Zoning: Property Rights and Local Governance in Urban Land Use” 
(2003) 35:1 Environment and Planning A 133 at 133. 
89
 Sarah Hamill, “Community, Property, and Human Rights: The Failure of Property-as-Respect,” this volume. 
90
 Brigham, supra note 40 at 3; Gray & Gray, Idea of Property, supra note 29 at 15; Crawford Macpherson, “The 
Meaning of Property” in Crawford MacPherson, ed, Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (Toronto: 
University of Toronto, 1978); Joseph Singer, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices (Boston: Little Brown, 
1993); Arnold Weinrib, “Information and Property” (1988) 38:2 UTLJ 117. 
91
 Simon Chamberlain calls these development permissions the “fifth factor of production” (the others being land, 
labor, capital, and skill) because they are elements of the production process that increase the value of the initial 
input, land. Simon B Chamberlain, “Aspects of Developer Behaviour in the Land Development Process,” Research 
Paper No 56, (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1972) at 4. 
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 Section 47 of the Planning Act, 1990 gives the Minister of Municipal Affairs 
and Housing the authority to rezone, without public notice or hearing, any property in Ontario.
93
 
Zoning orders are rarely used in jurisdictions with existing planning authorities and zoning by-
laws.
94
 Yet zoning orders represent a latent form of authority that can be used at the discretion of 
the ruling government, even in jurisdictions with existing planning authority and official plans. 
The minister's zoning order is a powerful tool that although rare, renders legal zoning categories 
subject to change at the determination of the provincial government. They are usually justified 
with reference to public or provincial “interests,” but as Carol Rose notes, terms such as 
“interest” have multiple meanings.
95
 In the case of the ORM, the Harris government had many 
interests, including popular support and conflict resolution. A minister's zoning order is therefore 
a tangible way that various political interests can be transformed into specific rules affecting 
property rights. 
 When the Harris government
96
 granted some ORM developers permission to build 6,600 
housing units on the ORM through a zoning order and minutes of settlement, the opposition 
Liberal party strongly opposed this deal. In late 2003 the Liberal government, under the 
leadership of Dalton McGuinty, won the provincial election, promising, as part of the election 
campaign, to cancel the deal and halt all new housing construction on the ORM. Once elected, 
however, McGuinty backtracked on this promise, citing legal agreements that had been made 
between the Conservatives and the developers prior to the election. In the fall of 2003, McGuinty 
fulfilled election promises to begin developing a massive greenbelt of protected agricultural and 
environmental lands (Figure 3). Greenbelt legislation was enacted 24 February 2005 through the 
Greenbelt Act, 2005.
97
 The Greenbelt Act authorized the Greenbelt Plan, which specified land 
uses for the greenbelt.
98
 The Greenbelt Plan incorporates the existing regional plans, the Niagara 
Escarpment Plan, and the Oak Ridges Moraine Plan, and includes a new category called the 
“Protected Countryside.”
99
 The Protected Countryside includes three main categories of land use 
with differing policies: the Agricultural System, the Natural System, and Settlement Areas.
100
 
Only in settlement areas, which are defined by existing municipal boundaries of towns, villages, 




                                                 
92
 Developers were permitted to develop approximately 375 hectares of land, part of which would become the 
subdivision “Macleod's Landing,” on the ORM near Yonge Street in Richmond Hill; Sandberg, Wekerle, & Gilbert, 
supra note 52 at 257. 
93
 Planning Act, supra note 68. 
94
 MMAH, Citizen’s Guide, supra note 73. 
95
 Rose, “Property and Expropriation,” supra note 45 at 1. 
96
 While in this article I mainly associate the Oak Ridges Moraine conflict and legislation with the Conservative 
provincial government led by Mike Harris, Harris resigned and was succeeded by Ernie Eves in May 2002. 
97
 Greenbelt Act, supra note 3. 
98
 The Greenbelt Plan specified different categories of land and their associated zoning. The “Protected 
Countryside” is most restrictive in terms of housing development, whereas “Settlement Areas” largely leave land 
use controls up to the local municipalities. Expansions to settlement areas, however, are subject to strict provincial 
controls, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Greenbelt Plan, 2005 (Toronto: Ministry of Municipal Affairs 
and Housing, 2005) [Greenbelt Plan]. 
99
 Ibid at 3. 
100
 Ibid at 12. 
101
 Ibid at 24.  
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 Figure 3. The Greenbelt Plan Area in southern Ontario.
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 Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Greenbelt Plan Appendix II: Schematic Showing Settlements Within 
Greenbelt Area (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2005), online: 
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 Stakeholder and public consultation processes used to formulate greenbelt legislation in 
some ways mirrored the ORM process. In February 2004, the Minister of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing, John Gerretsen, appointed a stakeholder advisory body, the “Greenbelt Task Force” to 
develop principles and lead public and stakeholder consultations.
103
 The composition of the Task 
Force included representatives of municipal and regional municipalities, five industry 
representatives, including two developers and one from the aggregate industry, and five NGOs, 
of which four represented environmental organizations. Public meetings were held across the 
greenbelt planning area and in August 2004 the Greenbelt Task Force produced a 
recommendations report
104
 from which provincial inter-ministerial teams then developed a draft 
greenbelt plan,
105
 which was approval in February 2005.
106
 Similar to the ORM conservation 
legislation, Section 24 of the Greenbelt Act specifies “transitional” clauses specifying the start 
date of greenbelt legislation as 16 December 2004; development applications approved prior to 




 But the greenbelt legislation also differs in important ways from the ORM legislation. For 
one, ORM legislation was fueled by resistance, over a long period of time (at least a decade), 
from homeowner groups, environmental groups, and diverse other actors.
108
 Legislation was to a 
large extent the coming together of long-standing land use conflict and a specific moment of 
electoral politics, where the Conservative government felt compelled to resolve this land dispute 
in order to maintain the support of its broad constituency.
109
 The Conservatives, under Mike 
Harris, took action on the ORM not necessarily because they prioritized environmental 
protection, but rather because they were under political pressure to do so by their constituency, 
which included many homeowner activists on the moraine, especially wealthy owners of large 
estate lots.
110
 Ideologically, the Harris government was opposed to government “interference” in 
business, including the land development business.
111
 Roger Keil argues that Harris’s land use 
policies both retreated from environmental regulations enacted by previous governments, and 
reworked environmental regulations to favour privileged groups, such as home owners and land 
developers.
112
 The action the Harris government took in 2001 to protect the ORM must be 
understood within a specific neoliberal institutional setting. It took action to protect the 
                                                 
103
 Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Toward a Golden Horseshoe Greenbelt. Greenbelt Task Force 
Discussion Paper: A Framework for Consultation, May 2004 (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2004) at 3, 5. 
104
 Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Toward a Golden Horseshoe Greenbelt. Greenbelt Task Force 
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105
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environment in order to protect its conservative electoral base, which was calling for protection 
of the moraine. But it certainly was not going to abandon its corporate allies—land developers—
and ensured that some of them were ultimately protected (and compensated through the land 
exchange) for loss of what developers perceived as their development rights. The process of 
developing legislation was characterized by negotiation and compromise, where the provincial 
government sought to appease the interests of environmental groups, homeowners, and 
developers by inviting them to work together on the ORM advisory panel. 
 On the other hand, the McGuinty Liberal government seemed to have little incentive to 
appease developers during enactment of greenbelt legislation, even though many developers 
supported the Liberal party through campaign contributions and other forms of fundraising. 
David Pond suggests that provincial governments in Canada are particularly inclined towards 
land use based activism, given their responsibility for land use regulation.
113
 According to Pond, 
although this activism is common across all political parties, the form it takes can vary 
extensively. Activism also has both historical and future-oriented dimensions. As third-phase 
institutionalists note, political actors must confront existing rules and norms, and evaluate to 
what extent they can navigate these legacies as they try to assert their own agendas.
114
 The 
McGuinty government, at least in its first mandate, positioned itself in direct opposition to the 
Conservatives. Primarily under Mike Harris, the Conservative government, from 1995 to 2003, 
carried out its “Common Sense Revolution”
115
 that, among other things, reduced funding to 
environmental programs and agencies;
116
 restructured the land use planning system in Ontario by 
reforming the OMB in favour of developers;
117
 and “streamlined” the development process by 
reducing “delays” and the scope of development applications.
118
 While the McGuinty 
                                                 
113
 Pond, “Greenbelt Politics,” supra note 1 at 244. 
114
 Olsson, supra note 6 at 26. 
115
 The Common Sense Revolution had four main goals: reducing taxes; reducing and improving efficiency of 
government spending; reducing so-called red tape that was said to be hampering growth; and balancing the budget. 
Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, The Common Sense Revolution (Toronto: Progressive Conservative 
Party, 1994).  
116
 These include budget reductions to what was then the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of 
Natural Resources, and Conservation Authorities; reductions in scope of the Environmental Protection Act, Ontario 
Water Resources Act, and Conservation Authorities Act; and repeal of many of the former NDP government’s land 
use planning reforms that it had carried out through the Commission on Planning and Development Reform; Mark 
Winfield & Greg Jenish, Ontario’s Environment and the ‘Common Sense Revolution’ (Toronto: Canadian Institute 
for Environmental Law and Policy, 1996). 
117
 As David Pond outlines in his analysis of Planning Act reforms in the 1990s, the NDP government made 
changes to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) in 1994 that compelled board decisions to “be consistent with” 
provincial policy, replacing what had been “have regard to” provincial policy. After winning the provincial election 
in 1995, the Harris government reverted to the “have regard to” clause. The Harris government also reduced the time 
municipalities (planners and/or council) had to make decisions on development applications and zoning decisions 
before developers could appeal to the OMB; the Harris government also reduced what were considered to be 
“complete” applications, meaning that municipal planning staff were often lacking information required for them to 
make an informed decision on a planning application, resulting in delays and more appeals by developers to the 
OMB; David Pond, “Rewriting the Rules of the Game: The Common Sense Revolution and Administrative Justice” 
(Paper presented at the Annual Canadian Political Science Association Conference, 3 June 2004) [Pond, “Rules of 
the Game”]  
118
 “Streamlining” of the development process was carried out mainly through the Land Use Planning and 
Protection Act, SO 1996, c 4, which gave municipalities more control over planning decisions; reduced the power of 
the province at the OMB by only permitting one ministry, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, to appeal 
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government inherited this “streamlined” land use planning regime, it signalled its own agenda 
early in its campaign by announcing that it would not only halt further development on the 
ORM, but would also create a massive regional greenbelt in order to stop sprawl and preserve 
agricultural land in the Toronto region.
119
 The McGuinty government embraced growth 
management and a highly interventionist environmental agenda of land use regulation, an agenda 
that angered many landowners.
120
 This signaled a change in institutional culture where 
developers were no longer as privileged a social group as they had been under the Harris 
government. 
 The McGuinty government did encounter resistance from one development group
121
 
during enactment of greenbelt legislation, which provides an illustrative comparison to the 
Seaton land exchange by the Harris government. This development group, led by notable 
Toronto region developer Silvio DeGasperis, owned land in part of an agricultural preserve 
called the Duffins Rouge Agricultural Preserve (DRAP), an approximately 1900 hectare triangle 
of land located just west of the Seaton lands in Pickering (see Figure 4; note the DRAP is 
referred to on the map as Agricultural Assembly). DeGasperis and other landowners on the 
DRAP (collectively known as the West Duffins Landowner Group) had been working with the 
City of Pickering to carry out a Growth Management Study (GMS) beginning in 2002; the study 
recommended development of approximately 400 hectares of the DRAP lands, near the village 
of Cherrywood (Figure 4, Figure 5), that were owned by DeGasperis.
122
 The GMS also 
designated much of the Seaton lands as “natural heritage system” (Figure 5), even though by 
2001 the province has signaled its intentions to exchange the Seaton lands and approve them for 
urban development. 
 While the City of Pickering ultimately acknowledged the provincial plan to develop 
Seaton and preserve the DRAP as agricultural land and part of the Greenbelt, the West Duffins 
Landowner Group insisted that the Cherrywood Lands be removed from the Greenbelt. 
DeGasperis' firm, Duffins Capital Corp, a member of the West Duffins Landowner Group, made 
a presentation 1 February 2005 to standing committee at the provincial legislature debating the   
                                                                                                                                                             
planning decisions to the OMB; and reduced the time permitted by planning authorities to make decisions on 
development or rezoning proposals. The Harris government also formulated a new Provincial Policy Statement that 
reduced municipal requirements for affordable housing, schools, parks, and hospitals when planning new 
developments, and also allowed for less stringent regulations on building near sensitive environmental features; 
Pond, “Rules of the Game,” supra note 117 at 21. 
119





 For example, the president of the Greater Toronto Home Builders’ Association penned an article in the Toronto 
Star criticizing many of the new McGuinty governments decisions, including OMB reform and the greenbelt; Joe 
Valela, “Proposed planning reforms will hurt affordability,” Toronto Star (29 November 2003) M4. 
121
 This group, or parts of this group, have been referred to by different names: the West Duffins Landowners 
Group, Duffin Capital Corp., Hollinger Farms No 1 Inc., and Altona Farms Inc.; the main developer involved in 
these groups is Silvio DeGasperis, a principal of TACC Construction. 
122
 Dillon Consulting Limited, City of Pickering growth management study: Phase 2, preferred growth management 
concept and structure (Toronto: Dillon Consulting Limited, 2004). 
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Figure 4. Study area of the City of Pickering Growth Management Study.
123
                                                 
123
 Map adapted from City of Pickering, Growth Management Study Area Boundary as Per Council Resolution 
#29/02 (Pickering: City of Pickering Planning and Development Department, 2002). 
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Figure 5. Recommended plan of the City of Pickering Growth Management Study.
124
 
                                                 
124
 Map adapted from Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Central Pickering Development Plan (Toronto: 
Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2006) at 15. 
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 Its argument was that development on the DRAP, instead of Seaton, would 
better protect the environment and the cultural heritage of Pickering; that agricultural 
opportunities were greater in Seaton than in the DRAP; that the DRAP lands were more readily 
serviced (water, sewer, electricity, roads) since they were closer to the existing urban area; and 
that the agricultural capabilities of parts of the DRAP were quite limited. When this argument 
failed to convince the McGuinty government, DeGasperis, through the companies Hollinger 
Farms No. 1 Inc. and Altona Farms Inc., filed a lawsuit against the provincial government, 
specifically the Minister of Environment and the Ontario Realty Corporation, claiming that the 
government did not carry out a proper environmental assessment for the Seaton lands.
126
 The 
court dismissed the case, stating that the landowner group filed the lawsuit in order to “frustrate, 
disrupt and delay the [Seaton] land exchange as a further step in their ongoing war with the 
Province in their attempts to harass and intimidate the Province into permitting development on 
their lands adjoining the Seaton Lands.”
127
 This war was described in a Toronto Star article 
explaining how DeGasperis was resisting McGuinty's greenbelt; “Pushing back is a polite way of 
characterizing the war he's been waging against the province since the fall of 2004, when Dalton 
McGuinty's Liberals slapped the greenbelt on 400 hectares of Pickering farmland DeGasperis 
wants to turn into more subdivisions.”
128
 But McGuinty paid little attention to DeGasperis or the 
many other landowners who perceived that their property rights had diminished with greenbelt 
legislation. In one notable letter to the editor in the Toronto Star, a landowner states his 
frustration with the McGuinty government, suggesting that even the very wealthy were not able 
to defend their property rights: 
 
The end of the rights of the private-property owner is in sight when a developer with 
deep pockets cannot assert his property rights by spending $5 million. What is a mere 
mortal to do? The province's greenbelt legislation, which took away Silvio 
DeGasperis’s [principle of Hollinger Farms] rights on his property, mine and 
thousands of other homeowners right across the province, amounts to expropriation 
without compensation. … Every time I see those green signs on the highway, 
‘Entering Ontario's Greenbelt,’ I feel sick. Where did they get the greenbelt? They 




Despite these claims, the McGuinty government proceeded with greenbelt legislation, and 
provided no compensation to appease landowners,
130
 although some developments, such as 
                                                 
125
 Legislative Assembly of Ontario, “Standing committee on general government: Greenbelt Act, 2005, Bill 135, 
Tuesday 1 February, 2005,” (2005), online:< ontla.on.ca/committee-proceedings/transcripts/files_pdf/2005-02-
01_pdfG027.pdf> [perma.cc/2LNX-H7D2]. 
126
 Hollinger Farms No. 1 Inc. v Ontario (Minister of Environment), 2007 ON SCDC 229 [Hollinger]. 
127
 Ibid at 9; the connection between Silvio DeGasperis and the Seaton land exchange is indirect but important. 
DeGasperis opposed development of Seaton (and thus the land exchange that fast-tracked its development) because 
principle 6 of the ‘North Pickering Land Exchange Review Panel’ stated that Seaton should be developed in 
conjunction with preservation of the Duffins-Rouge Agricultural Preserve, the location of DeGasperis’s Cherrywood 
lands; MMAH, Land Exchange, supra note 71 at 2. 
128
 Laurie Monsebraaten, “If you push me around, I'll push back,” Toronto Star (28 September 2006) R1. 
129
 Phil Mahon, “A win for the environment?,” Toronto Star (18 June 2007) AA7. 
130
 Marco Amati & Laura Taylor. “From Green Belts to Green Infrastructure” (2010) 25:2 Planning Practice and 
Research 143 at 146. 
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quarries, highways, and infrastructure were permitted to continue,
131
 and the Greenbelt Plan 
includes mechanisms through which municipal councils of towns, villages, and hamlets can 
apply for “modest” urban boundary extensions.
132
 Similar to the ORM disputes,
133
 many 
landowners claimed to have suffered “expropriation without compensation” (or de facto 
expropriation), even though not land was expropriated, and for the most part, land was not down-
zoned, but rather existing zoning was frozen to conform to new land use categories, such as 
settlement, agricultural, and natural areas.
134
 When Hollinger Farms filed a lawsuit against the 
McGuinty government, McGuinty did not back down or resort to compromise the way the Harris 
government had done during the Seaton land exchange process. Hollinger Farms ended up losing 
in court, and the McGuinty government, as do all provincial governments in Canada,
135
 was able 
assert its authority to regulate land use. The McGuinty government used its authority to freeze 
the zoning of land without requiring compensation, since the existing use of land was not 
changed, and in so doing treated all landowners in a similar manner. The Harris government 
preferred instead to grant four large developers rights through a land exchange, and to formulate 
complex transitional clauses to permit select developers to develop land in a manner that was not 
available to other landholders. 
  
III. CONCLUSION: PROPERTY AND POLITICS IN THE 
TORONTO REGION 
 
Through a comparison of ORM Conservation legislation (enacted by the Conservatives under 
Mike Harris) and Greenbelt legislation (enacted by the Liberals under Dalton McGuinty) this 
article has illustrated that land use legislation affecting private property rights can serve political 
agendas and navigate practical solutions to land use conflicts. While both the ORM and 
Greenbelt legislation involved regional planning at the provincial level and significant loss of 
developers’ ability to apply to develop their land, the processes leading to these statutes were 
very different. ORM Conservation legislation was the result of years of opposition by many 
actors and interests to land development on the ORM. It also involved extensive stakeholder and 
public consultation in order to resolve long-standing conflict between developers, homeowner 
groups, environmental activists, and municipal government representatives. Some developers 
were able to negotiate a settlement that allowed them to continue to develop their ORM lands, 
and they were also the beneficiaries of a land exchange that provided them with developable land 
off the ORM. This article has shown that the process of developing the greenbelt, on the other 
                                                 
131
 Felix Fung & Tenley Conway, “Greenbelts as an Environmental Planning Tool: A Case Study of Southern 
Ontario, Canada” (2007) 9:2 Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 101; Gerda Wekerle et al, “Nature as a 
Cornerstone of Growth: Regional and Ecosystems Planning in the Greater Golden Horseshoe” (2007) 16:1 Canadian 
Journal of Urban Research 20.  
132
 According to the Greenbelt Plan, some urban boundary extensions are permitted, including “modest growth that 
is compatible with the long-term role of these settlements as part of the Protected Countryside and the capacity to 
provide locally based sewage and water services;” Greenbelt Plan, supra note 98 at 24. The Greenbelt Plan also 
must be reviewed every ten years, at which time “modest settlement area expansions may be possible for 
Towns/Villages;” ibid at 25. 
133
 See, for example, Lindgren & Clark, supra note 54 at 2. 
134
 Greenbelt Plan, supra note 98 at 3. 
135
 Hollinger, supra note 126. 
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hand, was relatively quick, involved little negotiation with landowners and included no 
compensatory measures.  
 The political conditions under which these two statutes were enacted were influential to 
the ultimate form these statutes took, but not explained by existing urban and planning theories 
of land use development. This joining up of politics and property rights is absent in much urban 
studies scholarship that sees governance in a context of rules and decisions that structure 
relations of power, as well as urban form, very strongly.
136
 In Canada, these rules and structures 
can be described as a “Westminsterian” parliamentary government, named after the British 
system from which it was derived: provinces are responsible for land use regulation; 
municipalities are granted their authority from the provinces; and property rights are not 
explicitly protected constitutionally in Canada.
137
 However, as Pond notes, these rules and 
structures are not fixed, nor the outcomes of land use disputes always predictable: “Public 
policies and the instruments relied upon to deliver them reflect the institutional frameworks 
within which policy is developed as well as the influence of the political and economic interests 
clustering around government.”
138
 Policy is not simply a reflection of an institutional framework 
detached from actors and external influence. Political and economic interests are deeply 
influential to the formulation and enactment of statutes. The Harris government had to navigate 
political and economic interests when enacting the ORM legislation. On the other hand, the 
McGuinty government was committed to developing a greenbelt and used its authority to bypass 
certain political and economic interests. This is possible because private property rights can be 
interpreted, and even changed, through legislation, in ways that enable particular government 
agendas. In this context, private property rights can be strategically changed by government 
actors, who, as third-phase institutionalists
139
 phrase it, exercise strategic political agency to 
change institutions, in this case institutions and cultures related to regional land use planning in 
southern Ontario. Furthermore, legislative power can be used selectively. Canadian provinces 
have the authority to legislate land use without compensating owners.
140
 However, the provinces 
do not always use this power: they act strategically to balance support and opposition.
141
 
According to Pond, provincial authorities exercise their power strategically for a variety of 
political and practical reasons: 
 
the province has to be selective about the occasions and extent to which it intervenes 
in local land-use issues. It cannot afford to run down its political capital 
indiscriminately with excessive engagements in the messy realities of municipal 
economic development, even when this might appear necessary to forestall policy 
drift and uphold system-wide planning goals. Every such intervention in the name of 
coherent growth management creates a new client of the provincial state with a 
vested interest in further involvement, while potentially alienating influential 
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note 33. 
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The local growth coalition seems to have been an important factor in preventing the Harris 
government from exercising its legislative power over land use more strongly. Gabriel Eidelman 
notes that the “growth machine” model of land-use planning was alive and well in Ontario in the 
early 2000s, with the Conservative government in full support of the economic investment, tax 
revenues, and electoral support that comes from land development.
143
 Influential corporate elites 
also support politicians and parties more directly. Canadian political scientist Robert McDermid 
has documented the financial contributions developers and the development industry have made 
to provincial parties, politicians, and election candidates, and to municipal election candidates in 
Ontario.
144
 It is likely that this political and economic context played a part in four large 
developers being compensated for harm due to government regulation absent any legal 
requirement compelling the Harris government to compensate them at all. 
 But respect for some developers and their private property rights on the ORM was not 
simply a matter of the Harris government making deals with its “developer friends,” as many 
suggested to me in interviews.
145
 Neither did the Seaton land exchange serve to reinforce the 
property rights of the exchange developers, even though it did ultimately give them rights to 
develop land elsewhere. For one, the idea for the land exchange did not originate with 
developers. Indeed two developers told me they were initially opposed to a land exchange, as 
they were used to (and preferred) developing in Richmond Hill rather than Pickering.
146
 The land 
exchange represented a complication for developers rather than a simple transfer of development 
rights. Developers are centrally concerned about risk and delays; the land exchange increased 
both. The land exchange also created uncertainty for the developers planning to develop their 
property on the ORM in Richmond Hill. This crisis, from the standpoint of developers, derived 
from the particular confluence of long-standing environmental activism and opposition to 
development; the need for the Harris government to resolve a land-based problem quickly in 
order to maintain public support; and the ultimate recognition by the moraine developers, who 
had been traditional allies of Conservative provincial governments, that in this case they would 
not be able to develop all of their moraine lands—a land exchange was not ideal but was better 
than nothing. Historical institutionalists stress the importance of path dependent processes, 
arguing that past decisions and events influence the course of subsequent events.
147
 Years of 
activism opposing development on the ORM, the existing relationship with developers and 
politicians, and the structural element of fixed election cycles must be seen as part of the history 
leading up to the ORM legislation. But, as is emphasized by third-phase institutionalists, political 
actors confront constraints, rules, and norms creatively, strategically evaluating which how 
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 Robert MacDermid, “Money and the 1999 Ontario Election” (1999) 7:6 Canada Watch 128; Robert MacDermid, 
“Funding Municipal Elections in the Toronto Region” (Paper presented at the Annual Canadian Political Science 
Association Conference, 3 June 2006); Robert MacDermid, Funding City Politics: Municipal Campaign Funding 
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 Developer Interviews, 26 April 2013; 15 May 2013. 
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power can be mobilized to achieve desired ends.
148
 The Harris government acted very 
strategically, including developers on the ORM advisory panel and making special deals with the 
largest and most powerful developers, a move that also appeased some of the environmental 
activists on the ORM advisory panel. Although critics of the land exchange suggest that 
developers “got all they deserved and more,”
149
 this is not entirely accurate. Developers were not 
clear winners on the ORM. Many had their lands entirely frozen, preventing further 
development, and those that received land in Pickering have not yet begun development (as of 
April 2017). 
 Conversely, greenbelt legislation was not simply the result of the McGuinty government 
exercising its executive power over private property rights in the name of the public interest (or 
to fulfill an election promise). Even though the greenbelt created uncertainty for many 
landowners, developers and other land interests were not clear losers at the wrong end of a strong 
provincial power over land use and property. Many firms’ landholdings adjacent to the greenbelt 
increased significantly in value after the greenbelt legislation was enacted.
150
 Many developers I 
interviewed consider this increase in value to be a direct result of the legislation, as the greenbelt 
created a perceived shortage in developable land in the Toronto region, especially long term land 
that many developers attempt to bank years ahead of development. In this sense, the greenbelt 
indeed influenced the property rights of developers, but it did so in a way that made their land 
more valuable, not less. Furthermore, although development of housing on greenbelt lands is 
more difficult as a result of greenbelt legislation, many other types of activities, such as soil 
dumps, airports, and wind turbines have been permitted to continue.
151
 
 The example of land use conflict in the Toronto region, and the intersections of these 
conflicts with political agendas and the adjudication of property rights illustrate the politics of 
property rights in Canada. Institutionalist theorists remind us that governance, including legal 
processes governing land use, is deeply shaped by history, local cultures, actors, and ideas.
152
 
Legal and governance processes are also sites of political and strategic action.
153
 This is 
especially the case in Canadian land use planning, where land-based property disputes are often 
shifted away from the courts, negotiated instead through local disputes, local political deal-
making, and the mobilization of civil society actors and agencies.
154
 The trajectories of land use 
conflict and resolutions are often difficult to predict, as illustrated by the very different 
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procedures and outcomes surrounding the ORM conflicts versus development of a greenbelt in 
the Toronto region. In other words, the precise outcomes of private property disputes rely heavily 
on the local place-based actors, political contexts, and pre-existing relationships between state 
and non-state actors. 
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